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Abstract 
Purpose: This paper investigates the effect of corporate board attributes, ownership structure and firm-level 
characteristics on both corporate mandatory and voluntary disclosure behaviour in annual reports of Libyan listed and 
non-listed firms. 
Design/methodology/approach: Multivariate regression techniques are used to estimate the effect of corporate board 
and ownership structures on mandatory and voluntary disclosures of a sample of Libyan listed and non-listed firms 
between 2006 and 2010. 
Findings: First, we find that board size, board composition, the frequency of board meetings and the presence of an audit 
committee have an impact on the level of corporate disclosure. Second, we find evidence that indicates that director 
ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership and institutional ownership have a non-linear effect on the level of 
corporate disclosure. Finally, we document that firm age, liquidity, listing status, industry type and auditor type are 
positively associated with the level of corporate disclosure. 
Research limitations/implications: Future research could investigate disclosure practices using other channels of 
corporate disclosure media, such as corporate websites. Useful insights may be offered also by future studies by 
conducting in-depth interviews with corporate managers, directors and owners regarding these issues. 
Practical implications: Our evidence relating to the important role that corporate governance mechanisms play in 
shaping the expectations relating to the level of corporate voluntary and/or mandatory disclosures may be useful in 
informing investor decisions, as well as future policy and regulatory initiatives. 
Originality/value: Existing disclosure studies have mainly examined governance and voluntary disclosure relationship 
in listed firms often operating in developed countries. Our study, therefore, extends, as well as contributes to the existing 
literature by examining the governance–disclosure nexus relating to both mandatory and voluntary disclosures in both 
listed and non-listed firms operating in a developing country setting. 
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1. Introduction 
The quality and quantity of information disclosed in a company’s annual report depends on a 
country’s rules and regulations. Such factors include the: (i) level of economic development; (ii) 
development of the accounting profession; (iii) legislation in force; and (iv) existence of a 
sophisticated financial market (Chen & Roberts, 2010). This reflects the current situation in Libya, 
where changes in the economy, regulations relating to financial reporting, and laws have affected 
financial reporting practices (Kribat et al., 2013). As such, the Libyan context arguably offers an 
interesting setting for further analysis for a number of reasons. First, the Libyan economy used to be 
unique due to the peculiar characteristics of its previous political regime and the general rise in 
contribution of the petroleum sector to its economy over the last 30 years. A large proportion of this 
source of income has been used to establish industrial companies in non-oil sectors over the last two 
decades (Almehdi, 1997). Second, the Libyan legal system developed from a combination of Islamic 
legal principles and French civil law. Third, the use of Libyan Commercial Law (LCL) in 1954 was 
a pioneering effort in the corporate governance field. The establishment of the LCL in 1954 facilitated 
the development of corporate governance in Libya. In particular, it provided guidelines for 
establishing, registering, managing, governing and dissolving all forms of firms. Moreover, it also 
recommended the kind and type of sanctions that may be imposed on companies if they fail to meet 
the requirements of the law. Fourth, despite the growth in the economy, the accounting profession in 
Libya is still relatively under-developed. Finally, corporate ownership is largely concentrated in the 
form of government, family (directors) and foreign institutional investors. As such, these Libyan 
specific issues arguably offer an interesting setting to examine the drivers of corporate disclosures. 
Consequently, the current study seeks to examine the extent to which corporate board mechanisms, 
ownership structures, and firm-level characteristics, may influence the level of corporate disclosures 
in this distinct corporate context.  
 
Not surprisingly, there has been increasing interest in the issue of corporate governance, 
accountability, disclosure and transparency in recent years (Aljifri et al., 2014; Wang & Hussainey, 
2013). However, a careful assessment of this literature reveals a number of discernible weaknesses. 
Firstly, there is growing consensus that corporations engage in increased financial and non-financial 
disclosures for a multiple of theoretical reasons. This implies that the ability of any single theory to 
explain the varied motivations underlying corporate disclosures is limited. However, existing studies 
are either largely descriptive in nature (Cooke, 1989a, b, Inchausti, 1997, Ho & Shun, 2001) or 
underpinned often by a single theoretical framework (Chen & Roberts, 2010). Arguably, this limits 
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current understanding of the various motivations underlying corporate disclosures. Secondly, 
although corporate reporting consists of mandatory and voluntary disclosures, existing studies have 
focused almost exclusively on understanding the determinants of, and motivations for, corporate 
voluntary disclosures (Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Choi, 1973; Gray et al., 1995). Thirdly, although the 
majority of corporations are not listed, existing studies examining the motivations for, and 
determinants of, corporate disclosures have focused mainly on listed corporations (Barako et al., 
2006). By contrast, there is an acute dearth of studies analysing corporate disclosures in non-listed 
corporations (Cooke, 1989a, b; Ho & Shun, 2001; Inchausti, 1997; Meek et al., 1995), and thereby 
impairing current understanding of corporate disclosure behaviour with respect to non-listed firms. 
Finally, despite increasing importance of developing countries around the world, existing studies 
examining corporate disclosure behaviour are primarily concentrated in developed countries with 
largely similar institutional and contextual characteristics (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). In contrast, 
developing countries, such as Libya have different economic, institutional, legal and political 
environments and thus, the effect of corporate governance, ownership and firm-level variables on 
corporate disclosure can be expected to be different from those that have been found for firms 
operating in developed countries. Therefore, an examination of the various factors that may influence 
corporate disclosure behaviour in developing countries, where empirical evidence is limited can help 
in providing a complete understanding of corporate disclosure behaviour (Aljifri et al., 2014; Cooke, 
1989a; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
 
Consequently, this paper seeks to extend, as well as contribute to the current literature in a number of 
ways. Firstly and unlike many prior studies that have simply examined how firm-level characteristics, 
such as firm size and industry, affect corporate disclosure behaviour, this study examines how 
corporate boards, executives and owners in addition to firm-level features drive the level of corporate 
disclosure. Secondly, distinct from prior studies, the current study examines the antecedents of both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Finally, in contrast to previous studies, this study analyses both 
listed and non-listed firms, and thereby providing new empirical insights relating to the disclosure 
behaviour of both listed and non-listed firms. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant 
literature and hypotheses development. The research method is outlined in section 3. Section 4 
presents the empirical results. The final section (section 5) presents the conclusions, policy 
implications of the results, and directions for future research. 
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2. Empirical literature and hypotheses development 
2.1 Corporate governance characteristics and disclosure  
Board size: According to agency theory, board size is a key determinant in monitoring managers. 
Samaha et al. (2012) suggest that organisations that have larger boards are less likely to be dominated 
by senior executives, and as a result, are more likely to disclose more financial and non-financial 
information than organisations with smaller boards. On the other hand, others claim that larger boards 
are often associated with poor communication and monitoring, including corporate disclosures, and 
therefore having a negative impact on the level of corporate disclosure (Jensen, 1993). In addition, 
resource dependence theory postulates that larger boards are more likely to consist of greater diversity 
of expertise and stakeholder representation, which can contribute to improved corporate reputation 
through enhanced disclosures. 
 
Empirically, most prior research supports a positive association between board size and corporate 
disclosure behaviour (Laksmana, 2008; Samaha et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). However, 
some researchers found no relationship between board size and disclosure level (e.g., Ebrahim & 
Fattah, 2015), whilst others argue that board size may have a negative impact on the board 
effectiveness. This is because free riding tends to be common within larger boards, whereby leading 
members tend to be less motivated to take part in decision making, which can lead to low levels of 
disclosure (Yermack, 1996; Byard et al., 2006). Thus, we hypothesise that: 
 
H1: There is a significant positive association between board size and the level of corporate 
disclosure. 
 
CEO Role Duality: Chief Executive Officer (CEO) role duality is where the CEO of a firm also serves 
as the chairman of the board. From the agency perspective, such duality in position provides the CEO 
with power that might negatively affect the board’s control. It is argued that effectiveness in board 
monitoring can be achieved by having a large number of independent directors, which can lead to 
greater transparency and disclosure (Gul & Leung, 2004). From a resource-dependence theory 
perspective, separating the board chairman and CEO positions can improve a firm’s legitimacy in its 
environment (legitimacy theory), as well as stakeholders’ participation (stakeholder theory) by 
encouraging equality and fairness in executive decision making. As such, CEO duality may 
negatively impact on the objectivity of a CEO’s decisions (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Ntim et al, 2012b). 
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Prior empirical research has provided mixed results regarding the role duality–disclosure nexus.  For 
example, some past studies have reported no significant association between these two variables 
(Arcay & Muiño, 2005; Ho & Shun, 2001), whilst others have found a negative relationship between 
the two variables (e.g., Eng & Mak, 2003; Gul & Leung, 2004; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a). Hence, 
we hypothesise that: 
 
H2: There is a significant negative association between role duality and the level of disclosure. 
 
Board composition: Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that corporate boards with a higher proportion of 
independent non-executive directors (NEDs) are more influential in monitoring and controlling 
managerial decisions. According to agency and stakeholder theories, the board of directors is 
perceived not only as a key mechanism of internal control for monitoring managers and mitigating 
agency problems between managers and shareholders, but also acting as a mechanism to advance the 
interests of other stakeholders, such as employees and communities (Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
 
Empirically, the findings of some studies indicate a positive association between NEDs and voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al., 2015), whilst other researchers found either no 
association (Aljifri et al., 2014; Ho & Shun, 2001) or a negative association (e.g., Ghazali & 
Weetman, 2006; Gul & Leung, 2004). Therefore, we conjecture that:     
 
H3: There is a significant positive association between the proportion of non-executive directors and 
the level of disclosure. 
 
Frequency of meetings: Ntim and Osei (2011) and Laksmana, (2008) report a positive relationship 
between the frequency of board meetings and the level of disclosure.  In contrast, Vafeas, (1999) and 
Alhazaimeh et al. (2014) find no significant relationship between the frequency of board meetings 
and voluntary disclosure. Thus, we hypothesise that: 
 
H4: There is a significant positive association between the number of board meetings and the level of 
disclosure. 
 
Existence of audit committee: According to agency theory, the existence of an audit committee can 
help firms to reduce agency conflicts. It is considered to be an important element for the board of the 
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directors to internally control decision making and enhance the quality of information flow between 
owners and managers (Arcay & Muiño, 2005; Fama, 1980). 
 
Empirically, Ho and Shun (2001), Barako et al. (2006), and Samaha et al. (2015) find that the presence 
of an audit committee has a positive impact on corporate disclosure behaviour. On the other hand, 
others have reported no association between disclosure and the presence of an audit committee 
(Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Aljifri et al., 2014). Hence, we hypothesise that:           
 
H5: There is a significant positive association between the existence of an audit committee and the 
level of disclosure. 
 
2.2 Ownership structure variables and disclosure 
Foreign ownership: Alhazaimeh et al. (2014) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find that there is a 
significant positive association between foreign ownership and the extent of corporate voluntary 
disclosure. However, Aljifri et al. (2014) find no association between foreign ownership and 
corporate financial disclosure. Thus, we hypothesise that: 
 
H6: There is a significant positive association between foreign ownership and the level of disclosure. 
 
Government ownership: High levels of government ownership with a strong political connection can 
offer protection against greater scrutiny and discipline by weak regulatory framework, which can lead 
to low levels of disclosure in such firms. Theoretically, firms with higher state ownership may easily 
obtain funding from the government, and therefore, these firms tend to attract investors with less 
incentive to disclose increased information. Conversely, these firms are under greater public scrutiny, 
leading to pressure to disclose more information. 
 
Empirically, Alhazaimeh et al. (2014), Ntim et al. (2012b) and Khan et al. (2013) report a positive 
association between government ownership and voluntary disclosure. However, Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) find an insignificant association, and Ebrahim and Fattah (2015) report a negative 
association between government ownership and voluntary disclosure. Therefore, we hypothesise that:     
 
H7: There is a significant positive association between government ownership and the level of 
disclosure. 
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Institutional ownership: Institutional investors play an influential role in the structure of corporate 
governance. From an agency theory perspective, institutional ownership is considered as a key part 
of effective control over a company, whereby managers, as influential stakeholders (stakeholder 
theory), disclose more information to meet the informational needs of institutional shareholders. 
 
Empirically, Ebrahim and Fattah (2015) provide evidence that suggests a positive association between 
institutional investors’ ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. However, Alhazaimeh et al. 
(2014) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a) find a negative association between institutional ownership 
and the level of disclosure. With regard to the Libyan context, the government’s plan to privatise its 
enterprises has led to an increase in the level of institutional ownership in Libyan privatised firms. 
Therefore, we expect firms with high institutional ownership to disclose more information. Hence, 
we hypothesise that: 
 
H8: There is a significant positive association between institutional ownership and the level of 
disclosure. 
 
Director ownership: Agency theory suggests that there is a contradictory association between 
voluntary disclosures and director ownership. The extent of managerial ownership can serve as a way 
of aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders, and thereby leading to an increase in 
the level of disclosure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Empirically, Eng and Mak (2003) and Wang and 
Hussainey (2013) found a negative association between director ownership and voluntary disclosure. 
Thus, we hypothesise that:     
 
H9: There is a significant negative association between director ownership and the level of disclosure. 
 
3. Research methodology 
3.1 Data collection and sampling 
This paper examines Libyan companies’ annual reports in terms of the association between corporate 
governance characteristics, ownership structure and the extent of disclosure. A disclosure index is 
developed to measure the level of disclosure1. In order to provide a comprehensive picture of 
corporate reporting in the Libyan context, annual reports of three sectors namely; banks, 
                                                          
1For the individual items contained in the index, see the additional supplementary materials available on the Journal’s 
webpage. 
8 
 
manufacturing and services were collected. The rationale for choosing these sectors is that “after the 
oil and gas sector”, they are the dominant sectors in the Libyan economy in terms of their contribution 
to the total gross domestic product. The oil and gas sector is excluded, as most of the companies 
operating in this sector are either foreign companies or partners of foreign companies with more 
advanced accounting and reporting practices. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Annual reports for five years (2006-2010) were collected from the LSM, company websites, Audit 
Bureau, and Tax Authority. Out of 28 listed companies on the LSM, the annual reports of 22 
companies were obtained. In addition, we collected annual reports from 23 large non-listed firms 
from the Audit Bureau. The period (2006-2010) was selected as 2006 witnessed the emergence of the 
LSM. Also, due to the Libyan uprising, which started in 2011, annual reports from 2011 onwards 
were not available. Consequently, a total of 211 annual reports were collected, of which 193 were 
usable.  
 
3.2 Variable measurement and model specification  
3.2.1 Dependent variable: construction of the disclosure index  
As there is a lack of a general theoretical framework regarding the choice and selection of items to 
be included in a disclosure index, the extant Libyan government regulations and laws were used to 
construct the disclosure index. As this part of the study did not focus on a specific user group, an un-
weighted index was applied. The following rules were used to build a comprehensive index: (i) the 
items required by statutory regulations (e.g., ITL); (ii) a review of relevant disclosure literature to 
identify items specific to this study; and (iii) items included in the annual reports published by Libyan 
companies (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2012a, b; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
 
This resulted in an index, consisting of 141 information items divided into mandatory and voluntary 
items. The mandatory list (MD) consists of 33 items, whilst the voluntary list (VD) is made up of 108 
items that are expected to be disclosed in the annual reports of Libyan firms. A binary coding scheme 
was used in which the presence of an item is scored 1, otherwise 0. Thus, with this unweighted scoring 
scheme, the higher a firm’s score, the better its disclosure will seem to be and vice-versa. 
 
 
9 
 
3.2.2 Reliability and validity of the disclosure index  
The final index was subjected to extensive review by three accounting specialists, one of them in the 
area of disclosure and transparency and two accountants at the LSM. These reviews resulted in adding 
four voluntary items and eliminating seven other items. In addition, each report was reviewed twice. 
Firstly, the annual reports were reviewed in order to familiarise ourselves with a firm’s business and 
activities, and thus assess the relevance of the index to that firm. The reliability of this index was 
piloted for a sample of 40 annual reports. Secondly, the annual reports were scored again to ensure 
consistency with the original scoring. The relevance of the mandatory items was determined by 
Libyan legislations, whilst voluntary items were similar to those used in previous studies. 
 
3.2.3 Regression model  
The multiple regression model employed is as follows: 
 
DL = β0 + β1Boards + β2DualP + β3BoCo + β4FreMee + β5AuCo + β6ForOwn + β7InstOwn + 
β8GovOwn + β9DirOwn + β10FS + β11FA + β12Gaering + β13Prof + β14Liq + β15Lis + β16IndTyp + 
β17AudTyp + β18Year + e                                                                                                                 ... (1) 
 
where, 
DL denotes MD (the mandatory disclosure); VD (the voluntary disclosure) and ODL (the overall 
disclosure level); β0 is the constant term; Boards is the board size; DualP is the role duality; BoCo is 
the board composition; FreMee is the frequency of meetings; AuCo is the auditor committee; ForOwn 
is foreign ownership; InstOwn is institutional ownership; GovOwn is government ownership; DirOwn 
is director ownership; FS is firm size; FA is firm age; Prof is profitability; Liq is liquidity; Lis is listing 
status; IndTyp is industry type; AudTyp is auditor type, YD is the year; and e is the error term. A 
summary of the definition and measurement of the variables is shown in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 3 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the variables. The table indicates that the level of 
compliance of the Libyan firms with the mandatory requirements is 77%. This level is still lower than 
the finding of previous studies (Gao & Kling, 2012; Omar & Simon, 2011). With regard to the VD, 
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Table 3 indicates that the extent of VD in the annual reports of the Libyan firms is 65% with a 
minimum score of 59 items. The average level of VD (65%) is higher when compared with previous 
studies (Omar & Simon, 2011). The overall disclosure level is nearly 68% with a minimum score of 
81 items and maximum of 114 items out of the total of 141 items of the disclosure index. There has 
been a steady increase in corporate disclosures MD, VD and ODL over time, consistent with previous 
studies (Omar & Simon, 2011). Regarding the independent variables, the average board size is eight 
members. Approximately 36% of the companies CEOs serve also as board chairmen, and the mean 
percentage of NEDs on the board is approximately 15%.  
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
4.2 Correlation analysis  
Table 4 shows the correlation analysis between all variables of the study. Since there is no high 
correlation among the variables, our analysis shows that there is no serious multicollinearity problem 
present among the independent variables.  
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Table 4 shows further that board size, board composition, frequency of meetings, audit committee, 
foreign ownership, firm size, gearing, profitability, listing status, industry type and auditor type are 
significantly and positively correlated with the overall disclosure level ODL. On the other hand, role 
duality and government ownership are negatively correlated with the ODL. 
 
4.3 Multivariate regression results and discussion 
The results of the regression analysis of the determinants of corporate disclosure are shown in Table 
5. The results presented in Table 5 show that approximately 54%, 85% and 82% of the variation in 
the disclosure index (MD, VD and ODL, respectively) between the sample companies could be 
explained by the nine independent variables together with the inclusion of eight control variables. 
These results are similar to those of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) of 46%, as well as Samaha et al.’s 
(2012) reported finding of 62%. 
 
Generally, the results indicate that the corporate governance variables are associated with the ODL. 
First, the analysis finds that the coefficient estimate on BoardS is negative and statistically significant 
with the ODL. This finding provides evidence that small boards of directors are more effective and 
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supports previous studies that reported similar findings (Yermack, 1996; Byard et al., 2006). 
Theoretically, this is consistent with the predictions of agency theory, which suggest that larger 
boards are associated with poor communication, co-ordination and free-riding problems, often 
leading to poor monitoring of corporate executives, and thereby impacting negatively on corporate 
disclosures.  
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Secondly, the study does not find any significant association between CEO role duality and the ODL. 
This result is in line with the findings of previous studies that found no significant association between 
the extent of disclosure and role duality, such as Arcay and Muiño (2005), and Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006). Similarly, the study finds that the coefficient estimate on BoCo is negative and statistically 
significant with the ODL. This finding rejects hypothesis H3. This finding is in line with the findings 
of Eng and Mak (2003) and Barako et al. (2006), who reported the same negative association, but it 
is inconsistent with the findings of Wang and Hussainey (2013) and Samaha et al. (2015), who 
reported a positive link between outside directors and disclosure. This negative association 
contradicts the predictions of agency, stakeholder and legitimacy theories regarding the presence of 
outside directors on corporate boards. This contradiction may be related to the cultural influence in 
such countries, where the appointment of independent non-executive directors is often based heavily 
on the social connections instead of the individuals’ professional competency. Further, the analysis 
finds that the coefficient estimate of FreMee is positive and statistically significant with the ODL. 
This finding supports H4. This implies that a higher frequency of board meetings contributes towards 
improving the quality of managerial monitoring, and therefore results in a positive influence on 
corporate disclosure.  
 
Thirdly, our findings suggest that there is a significant positive association between AuCo and the 
ODL. This means that hypothesis H5 is empirically supported. Our findings regarding the role of audit 
committee in explaining the ODL is consistent with those of Barako et al. (2006), and Samaha et al. 
(2015). Theoretically, this finding implies that the existence of an audit committee seems to help 
firms in reducing agency conflicts, particularly if non-executive directors dominate it. With regard to 
the ownership structure variables, Table 5 does not show any statistically significant evidence 
regarding the association between ownership structure variables and the ODL (including MD and 
VD). Therefore, our results do not support H6, H7, H8 or H9. Our results are in line with Ghazali and 
12 
 
Weetman (2006), who found that there was no association between ownership structure and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in Malaysia. 
 
The findings contained in Table 6 for listed firms are largely consistent with our primary findings in 
Table 5. With regard to non-listed companies, board composition (BoCo) and frequency of meetings 
(FreMee) are statistically significant with the ODL only, whilst the results are generally similar to 
those presented in Table 5. 
 
4.4 Additional analyses  
We conducted a number of additional analyses to check the robustness of the results. A number of 
past studies have shown that endogeneity can be a major problem within accounting and finance 
research of this nature, and therefore there is the need to sufficiently address any such potential 
endogeneity problems. We address potential endogeneity problems in this study as follows. Firstly, 
an instrumental variable is created using an alternative weighted index to test for endogeneity. Each 
sub-group is assigned an equal weight to the total. For example, the ODL consists of two groups in 
which 50 per cent is awarded to each group. Our results are presented in Columns 7, 8 and 9 of Table 
6. The results are consistent with those reported in Table 5. This suggests that our evidence is largely 
robust to sub-group estimations. 
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Secondly, two-stage least squares (2SLS) is employed to check for any potential endogeneity. To 
ensure that the 2SLS is appropriate, we first regress the unstandardized predicted values against the 
unstandardized residuals to check for any potential correlations (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2016). The 
results of 2SLS are presented in Table 6. The results in Table 7 support the primary results reported 
in Table 5 with no evidence of association except for government ownership (GovOwn) with a 
statistically significant association with the ODL (apart from observable minor sensitivities in the 
magnitude of the coefficients). 
 
Thirdly, we divided our sample into financial and non-financial companies as suggested by previous 
research (Elmagrhi et al., 2016). Table 7 indicates that, for non-financial companies, the results are 
consistent with our primary findings in Table 5. With regard to financial companies, board size 
(BoardS), and role duality (DualP) are positively and statistically significant with the ODL. For 
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ownership variables, the results presented in Table 7 are generally similar to those presented by OLS 
in Table 5, where no evidence of association is found. Interestingly, Table 7 indicates that foreign 
ownership (ForOwn) and institutional ownership (InstOwn) are positively and statistically significant 
with the ODL. 
 
Finally, previous studies argued that there is a non-linear relationship between board characteristics 
and ownership variables and corporate disclosure practices (Elmagrhi et al., 2016). To detect the 
presence of non-linear relationship between corporate governance variables and the extent of 
corporate disclosure, this study re-estimated the ODL by including the squared values of BoardS2, 
ForOwn2, GovOwn2, InstOwn2 and DirOwn2. The last Column in Table 7 presents the results of the 
non-linear model (NLM). The coefficients on BoardS2, GovOwn2, and InstOwn2 are statistically 
insignificant. However, the coefficients on ForOwn2 and DirOwn2 are significant, indicating an 
evidence of non-linearity between these two variables and the dependent variable (ODL). The 
findings of the remaining variables are still the same as our findings reported previously in Table 5 
(apart from observable minor sensitivities in the magnitude of the coefficients). As a result, these 
findings support the probability of the presence of non-linearity link only between ForOwn2 and 
DirOwn2 and the ODL. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the association between corporate governance characteristics, ownership 
structure and corporate disclosure behaviour in Libya.  Generally, the results suggest that the 
corporate governance variables are significant in explaining the extent of corporate disclosure in an 
annual report. Firstly, we can conclude that board size and board composition are found to be 
negatively related to the overall disclosure level, whilst the frequency of meetings and audit 
committee have a positive and statistically significant association with the overall disclosure level. 
With regard to ownership structure variables, no relationship is found between these variables and 
the overall level of disclosure. Despite the changes taking place during the investigated period (2006-
2010) when the Libyan economy started to witness a huge transfer of ownership of government 
enterprises to private investors (“privatization”), none of the ownership variables were found to 
support the agency relationship within the Libyan context.  
 
This paper extends, as well as makes a number of new contributions to the existing literature. Unlike 
previous studies that have examined how firm-level characteristics, such as firm size and industry, 
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affect corporate disclosure behaviour, the current study examines how corporate boards and 
ownership structure drive the level of corporate disclosure. Thus, this contributes to a small, but 
gradually increasing number of studies that have evaluated the effect of corporate governance and 
ownership structures on the level of corporate disclosure. Furthermore, distinct from prior studies that 
have focused mainly on examining the determinants of only voluntary disclosure, the current research 
examines the antecedents of both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Finally, this study has 
analysed both listed and non-listed firms, and thereby it has allowed for new empirical insights 
relating to the disclosure behaviour of both listed and non-listed firms in a developing country.   
 
The results have a number of implications. The results show that the disclosure level varies 
substantially among Libyan listed and unlisted firms. This provides Libyan authorities with a strong 
motivation to strengthen legal enforcement more by enhancing corporate governance and disclosure 
practices by establishing a compliance committee. This implies that Libyan authorities should 
consider imposing further mandatory requirements on Libyan firms to further protect investors and 
stakeholders. Further, the results reveal that ownership concentration has a negative effect on 
corporate disclosure. This suggests regulatory authorities may need to further reduce ownership 
concentration by amending listing rules that set a greater requirement for outside shareholders. 
 
Finally, there are a number of avenues for future research. There is an opportunity for future research 
to investigate disclosure practices using other channels of corporate disclosure, such as corporate 
websites in order to ascertain whether they have the same explanatory variables, as those of annual 
reports. Future research, in Libya, could extend the sample size as the sample size for this study was 
limited by data availability and constraints of manual data collection. Useful insights may be offered 
also by future studies by conducting in-depth interviews with corporate managers, directors and 
owners regarding these issues. A comparative study with other countries in the region, with 
alternative or more advanced accounting and governance practices would provide an opportunity for 
further research.  
 
References 
Alhazaimeh, A., Palaniappan, R. and Almsafir, M. (2014) 'The Impact of Corporate Governance and 
Ownership Structure on Voluntary Disclosure in Annual Reports among Listed 
Jordanian Companies'. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 129(0), pp 341-348. 
Aljifri, K. (2008) 'Annual Report Disclosure in a Developing Country: The Case of the UAE'. 
Advances in Accounting, 24(1), pp 93-100. 
15 
 
Aljifri, K., Alzarouni, A., Chew, N. and Tahir, M. I. (2014) 'The Association between Firm 
Characteristics and Corporate Financial Disclosures: Evidence from UAE Companies'. 
International Journal of Business & Finance Research, 8(2), pp 101-123. 
Al-Janadi, Y., Abdul Rahman, R., & Alazzani, A. (2016). Does Government Ownership Affect 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Disclosure? Evidence from Saudi Arabia. 
Managerial Auditing Journal, 31(8/9), 871-890.  
Arcay, M. B. and Muiño, M. F. (2005) 'Corporate Characteristics, Governance Rules and the Extent 
of Voluntary Disclosure in Spain'. Advances in Accounting, 21(0), pp 299-331. 
Barako, D. G., Hancock, P. and Izan, H. Y. (2006) 'Factors Influencing Voluntary Corporate 
Disclosure by Kenyan Companies'. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
14(2), pp 107-125. 
Barako, D.G., & Brown, A.M. (2008). Corporate Social Reporting and Board Representation: 
Evidence From The Kenyan Banking Sector. Journal of Management and Governance, 
12, 309-324. 
Byard, D., Li, Y. and Weintrop, J. (2006) 'Corporate Governance and the Quality of Financial 
Analysts’ Information'. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 25(5), pp 609-625. 
Chen, J. and Roberts, R. (2010) 'Toward a More Coherent Understanding of the Organization–Society 
Relationship: A Theoretical Consideration for Social and Environmental Accounting 
Research'. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(4), pp 651-665. 
Choi, F. D. S. (1973) 'Financial Disclosure and Entry to the European Capital Market'. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 11(2), pp 159-175. 
Cooke, T. E. (1989a) 'Disclosure in the Corporate Annual Reports of Swedish Companies'. 
Accounting and Business Research, 19(74), pp 113. 
Cooke, T. E. (1998) 'Regression Analysis in Accounting Disclosure Studies'. Accounting & Business 
Research,, 28(3), pp 209-224. 
Ebrahim, A. and Fattah, T. A. (2015) 'Corporate Governance and Initial Compliance with IFRS in 
Emerging Markets: The Case of Income Tax Accounting in Egypt'. Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 24(0), pp 46-60. 
Elmagrhi, M. H., Ntim, C. and Wang, Y. (2016) 'Antecedents of Voluntary Corporate Governance 
Disclosure: A Post-2007/08 Financial Crisis Evidence from the Influential UK 
Combined Code'. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in 
Society, 16(3), pp null. 
Eng, L. L. and Mak, Y. T. (2003) 'Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure'. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 22(4), pp 325-345. 
Fama and Jensen, M. C. (1983) 'Separation of Ownership and Control'. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26(2), pp 301-325. 
Freeman, R. E. and Reed, D. L. (1983). Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate 
Governance.  California Management Review, 25(3), pp88-106. 
Gao, L. and Kling, G. (2012) 'The Impact of Corporate Governance and External Audit on 
Compliance to Mandatory Disclosure Requirements in China'. Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 21(1), pp 17-31. 
Ghazali, N. A. M. and Weetman, P. (2006) 'Perpetuating Traditional Influences: Voluntary Disclosure 
in Malaysia Following the Economic Crisis'. Journal of International Accounting 
Auditing & Taxation, 15(2), pp 226-248. 
Gray, S., Meek, G. and Roberts, C. (1995) 'International Capital Market Pressures and Voluntary 
Annual Report Disclosures by U.S. and U.K. Multinationals'. Journal of International 
Financial Management & Accounting, 6(1), pp 43-68. 
Gul, F. A. and Leung, S. (2004) 'Board Leadership, Outside Directors' Expertise and Voluntary 
Corporate Disclosures'. Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, 23(5), pp 351-379. 
Haniffa, R. M. and Cooke, T. E. (2002) 'Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in Malaysian 
Corporations'. Abacus, 38(3), pp 317-349. 
16 
 
Ho, S. S. M. and Shun, W. K. (2001) 'A Study of the Relationship between Corporate Governance 
Structures and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure'. Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation, 10(2), pp 139-156. 
Inchausti, B. G. (1997) 'The Influence of Company Characteristics and Accounting Regulation on 
Information Disclosed by Spanish Firms'. European Accounting Review, 6(1), pp 45-
68. 
Jensen, M. C. (1993) 'The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems'. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), pp 831-880. 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976) 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure'. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp 305-360. 
Kribat, M., Burton, B. and Crawford, L. (2013) 'Evidence on the Nature, Extent and Determinants of 
Disclosures in Libyan Banks’ Annual Reports'. Journal of Accounting in Emerging 
Economies, 3(2), pp 88-114. 
Laksmana, I. (2008) 'Corporate Board Governance and Voluntary Disclosure of Executive 
Compensation Practices'. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(4), pp 1147-1182. 
Leung, S. and Horwitz, B. (2004) 'Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong 
Kong Evidence'. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 15(3), 
pp 235-260. 
Meek, G. K., Roberts, C. B. and Gray, S. J. (1995) 'Factors Influencing Voluntary Annual Report 
Disclosures by U.S., U.K. and Continental European Multinational Corporations'. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 26(3), pp 555-572. 
Ntim, C. G. and Osei, K. A. (2011) 'The Impact of Corporate Board Meetings on Corporate 
Performance in South Africa'. African Review of Economics and Finance, 2(2), pp 83-
103. 
Ntim, C. G. and Soobaroyen, T. (2013a) 'Black Economic Empowerment Disclosures by South 
African Listed Corporations: The Influence of Ownership and Board Characteristics'. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 116(1), pp 121-138. 
Ntim, C. G. and Soobaroyen, T. (2013b) 'Corporate Governance and Performance in Socially 
Responsible Corporations: New Empirical Insights from a Neo-Institutional 
Framework'. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21(5), pp 468-494. 
Ntim, C. G., Opong, K. K. and Danbolt, J. (2012b) 'The Relative Value Relevance of Shareholder 
versus Stakeholder Corporate Governance Disclosure Policy Reforms in South Africa'. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(1), pp 84-105. 
Ntim, Opong, K., Danbolt, J. and Thomas, D. (2012a) 'Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosures 
by Post-Apartheid South African Corporations'. Journal of Applied Accounting 
Research, 13(2), pp122-144. 
Omar, B. and Simon, J. (2011) 'Corporate Aggregate Disclosure Practices in Jordan'. Advances in 
Accounting, 27(1), pp 166-186. 
Samaha, K., Dahawy, K., Hussainey, K. and Stapleton, P. (2012) 'The Extent of Corporate 
Governance Disclosure and its Determinants in a Developing Market: The Case of 
Egypt'. Advances in Accounting, 28(1), pp 168-178. 
Samaha, K., Khlif, H. and Hussainey, K. (2015) 'The Impact of Board and Audit Committee 
Characteristics on Voluntary Disclosure: A Meta-Analysis'. Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 24(0), pp 13-28. 
Vafeas, N. (1999) 'Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance'. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 53(1), pp 113-142. 
Wang, M. and Hussainey, K. (2013) 'Voluntary Forward-Looking Statements Driven by Corporate 
Governance and their Value Relevance'. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 
32(3), pp 26-49. 
Yermack, D. (1996) 'Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors'. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), pp 185-211. 
17 
 
TABLES 
Table 1. Sample Selection Process 
 Number of firms Number of observations 
Industrials 
Financial  
Services 
130 
20 
100 
650 
100 
500 
Initial sample 250 1250 
Less: Small and medium companies 
Industrials 
Financial  
Services 
 
115 
4 
86 
 
575 
20 
430 
 (205) (1025) 
Less: Missing data 
Industrials 
Financial  
Services 
 
2 
3 
2 
 
10 
15 
7 
 (7) (32) 
Industrials 
Financial  
Services 
13 
13 
13 
65 
65 
63 
Final sample 39 193 
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Table 2: Definition and measurement of variables 
Abbreviated name Full name Description Predicted sign 
Dependent variable    
MD Total mandatory disclosure Percentage of scored mandatory disclosure  
VD Total voluntary disclosure  Percentage of scored voluntary disclosure  
ODL Overall disclosure level Percentage of overall disclosure items   
Independent variables   
BoardS Board size The number of board members + 
DualP  Duality in position 1 if company’s CEO serves as a board chairman, 0 
otherwise 
_ 
BoCo Board composition Ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the 
total number of the directors 
+ 
FreMee Frequency of meetings Number of board meetings during the year + 
AuCo Audit committee 1 if an audit committee exists, 0 otherwise + 
ForOwn Foreign ownership Foreign ownership to total owners’ ratio + 
GovOwn Government ownership Government ownership to total owners’ ratio + 
InstOwn Institutional ownership Institutional ownership to total owners’ ratio + 
DirOwn Director ownership The percentage of shares outstanding held by the board 
of directors 
- 
Control variable   
FS Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets + 
FA Firm age Number of years since foundation + 
Gearing Gearing The ratio of total debt to equity + 
Prof Profitability Net profit to total shareholders’ equity + 
Liq Liquidity Company’s current assets to current liabilities + 
List Listing status 1 if the company is listed and 0 otherwise + 
IndTyp Industry type 1 = Financial (banks or insurance), 0 otherwise + 
AudTyp Auditor type 1 = a company audited by one of  the big four, 0 
otherwise 
+ 
YD Year  Dummies for each of the five years 2006 - 2010  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for dependent, independent and control variables 
Variables  Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum N 
MD 
Dependent 
76.97 0.07 2.21 22.00 32.00 193 
VD 65.13 0.06 6.53 59.00 85.00 193 
ODL 67.90 0.06 8.38 81.00 114.00 193 
Boards 
Independent 
8.05 8.00 2.45 3.00 14.00 193 
DualP 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 193 
BoCo 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.00 0.43 193 
FreMee 6.21 6.00 1.59 3.00 12.00 193 
AuCo 0.54 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 193 
ForOwn 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.75 193 
GovOwn 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.00 1.00 193 
InstOwn 0.29 0.25 0.20 0.00 0.75 193 
DirOwn 0.34 0.27 0.28 0.00 0.46 193 
FS 
Control 
237.36 19.12 217.21 34.86 986.75 193 
FA 0.22 23.00 7.85 7.00 39.00 193 
Gearing 0.32 0.33 0.07 0.12 0.54 193 
Prof 0.41 0.40 0.09 0.22 0.51 193 
Liq 0.25 0.25 0.09 0.04 0.45 193 
List 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 193 
IndTyp 0.34 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 193 
AudTyp 0.52 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 193 
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Table 4: Correlations matrix of all variable 
 
Notation: *, ** significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels (2−tailed) respectively.  
 
 
 
 MD VD ODL BoardS DualP BoCo FreMee AuCo ForOwn GovOwn InstOwn DirOwn FS FA Gearing Prof Liq List IndTyp AudTyp 
MD 
                    
VD 
.831**                    
ODL 
.897** .990**                   
BoardS 
.166* .301** .279**                  
DualP 
-.220** -.246** -.249** -.172*                 
BoCo 
.154* .277** .257** .124 -.032                
FreMee 
.234** .377** .357** .304** -.147* .192**               
AuCo 
.265** .393** .373** .064 -.112 .135 .244**              
ForOwn 
.175* .245** .235** -.030 -.077 .018 .022 .127             
GovOwn 
-.330** -.397** -.394** -.170* .107 -.072 -.168* -.109 -.441**            
InstOwn 
.002 -.022 -.018 .043 .040 -.192** .060 -.116 -.315** -.320**           
DirOwn 
.031 .073 .068 .103 -.030 .424** .086 .029 .153* -.276** -.025          
FS 
.136 .293** .264** .040 -.131 .068 .158* .248** .319** -.001 -.196** -.251**         
FA 
.059 .110 .109 -.117 -.029 .220** -.054 -.081 .056 -.166* .007 .228** .097        
Gearing 
.265** .275** .281** .105 -.038 .100 .166* .011 .099 .020 -.323** -.119 .331** -.072       
Prof 
.440** .489** .492** .233** -.215** .142* .065 .267** .216** -.226** -.056 -.035 .268** .056 .061      
Liq 
.040 -.109 -.070 -.089 .023 .082 -.108 -.041 -.070 .063 -.110 .187** -.124 .148* -.137 -.156*     
List 
.560** .631** .635** .440** -.304** .285** .278** .150* .162* -.450** -.034 .189** .120 .012 .266** .342** -.146*    
IndTyp 
.383** .470** .455** .231** -.074 -.027 -.007 .109 .108 -.084 -.067 -.259** .309** -.119 .301** .437** -.518** .373**   
AudTyp 
.574** .727** .715** .398** -.327** .303** .362** .220** .243** -.473** .069 .153* .180* .108 .190** .403** -.130 .720** .285**  
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Table 5: Regression analysis of the determinants of corporate disclosure 
Notation: T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. 
 
 
 
Variables 
MD VD ODL 
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Corporate governance variables 
BoardS -.122 .035** -.059 .079* -.078 .032** 
DualP -.011 .834 .051 .101 .037 .276 
BoCo -.118 .065* -.076 .038** -.091 .024** 
FreMee .103 .076* .140 .000*** .137 .000*** 
AuCo .081 .153 .113 .001*** .110 .002*** 
Ownership structure variables 
ForOwn -.001 .988 -.012 .803 -.009 .854 
GovOwn .085 .275 -.056 .211 -.021 .663 
InstOwn .026 .766 -.017 .737 -.006 .909 
DirOwn -.019 .777 .024 .524 .014 .736 
Control variables 
FS -.077 .291 .114 .007*** .069 .133 
FA .060 .284 .055 .088** .058 .094* 
Gearing .132 .030** -.005 .877 .031 .418 
Prof .152 .020** .020 .594 .055 .173 
Liq .264 .000*** .114 .002*** .158 .000*** 
List .204 .015** .118 .014** .146 .005*** 
IndTyp .537 .000*** .512 .000*** .540 .000*** 
AudTyp .219 .059** .081 .225 .121 .096* 
YD Included   Included  Included  
Std. error .04519 .02345 .02510 
Durbin-
Watson 
1.568 1.666 1.620 
F-value 10.954 48.069 39.436 
R²  Adj. .544 .849 .822 
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Table 6: Additional analyses of the determinants of corporate disclosure 
Notation: T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
Variables  
Listed Non-listed  Weighted Index  
MD VD ODL MD VD ODL MD VD ODL 
Corporate governance variables        
BoardS .043** 
-.201 
.024** 
-.102 
.014** 
-.138 
.194 
-.118 
.469 
-.050 
.323 
-.071 
.039** 
-.119 
.084* 
-.067 
.035** 
-.081 
 
DualP .379 
-.082 
.001*** 
.149 
.089* 
.090 
.967 
.004 
.338 
-.072 
.464 
-.057 
.662 
-.024 
.118 
.057 
.231 
.043 
 
BoCo .769 
-.032 
.650 
-.022 
.664 
-.026 
.004*** 
-.329 
.027** 
-.195 
.008*** 
-.243 
.128 
-.097 
.264 
-.048 
.156 
-.061 
 
FreMee .238 
.123 
.000*** 
.178 
.004*** 
.174 
.323 
.096 
.038** 
.157 
.053** 
.151 
.097* 
.096 
.002*** 
.126 
.001*** 
.126 
 
AuCo .077* 
.181 
.002*** 
.148 
.004*** 
.168 
.951 
.006 
.074* 
.136 
.158 
.111 
.122 
.088 
.020** 
.090 
.014** 
.094 
 
Ownership variables        
ForOwn .528 
.076 
.273 
-.060 
.728 
-.024 
.496 
-.108 
.495 
.083 
.758 
.039 
.952 
-.005 
.164 
.072 
.243 
.059 
 
GovOwn .102 
.237 
.452 
-.049 
.688 
.033 
.451 
-.107 
.481 
-.077 
.428 
-.089 
.376 
.069 
.646 
-.024 
.906 
-.006 
 
InstOwn .591 
.077 
.896 
-.008 
.839 
.016 
.718 
-.057 
.837 
.025 
.967 
.005 
.819 
.020 
.546 
.036 
.559 
.034 
 
DirOwn .915 
.014 
.261 
.068 
.452 
.057 
.819 
.025 
.312 
.084 
.389 
.074 
.852 
.012 
.394 
.038 
.434 
.034 
 
Control variables         
FS .195 
-.181 
.144 
.093 
.824 
.017 
.317 
-.107 
.249 
.095 
.568 
.049 
.136 
-.104 
.593 
.025 
.996 
.000 
 
FA .523 
.062 
.058** 
.084 
.131 
.083 
.993 
-.001 
.418 
.062 
.531 
.050 
.466 
.041 
.122 
.059 
.123 
.058 
 
Gearing .057** 
.210 
.185 
.066 
.069** 
.113 
.516 
.064 
.770 
-.022 
.989 
-.001 
.011** 
.155 
.793 
.011 
.313 
.041 
 
Prof .162 
.164 
.083* 
.093 
.071* 
.120 
.289 
.107 
.198 
-.100 
.511 
-.052 
.038** 
.135 
.904 
.005 
.457 
.032 
 
Liq .005*** 
.347 
.031** 
.121 
.005*** 
.196 
.000*** 
.430 
.105 
.138 
.013** 
.223 
.000*** 
.245 
.007*** 
.117 
.001*** 
.149 
 
List - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
.012** 
.210 
.090* 
.095 
.027** 
.124 
 
IndTyp .000*** 
.536 
.000*** 
.575 
.000*** 
.602 
.070* 
.207 
.000*** 
.370 
.000*** 
.352 
.000*** 
.404 
.000*** 
.279 
.000*** 
.318 
 
AudTyp .180 
.139 
.002*** 
.150 
.009*** 
.157 
.222 
.136 
.043** 
.175 
.049** 
.176 
.244 
.101 
.004*** 
.170 
.005*** 
.164 
 
YD Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included  
Durbin-
Watson 
1.728 2.059 1,998 1.983 1.848 1.807 1.700 1.632 1.657 
 
F-value 3.768 33.259 20.049 3.656 8.619 7.781 11.335 33.785 34.840  
Adj. R² 0.363 0.869 0.797 0.372 0.630 0.602 0.542 0.790 0.795  
N 98 95 193  
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Table 7: Additional analyses of the determinants of corporate disclosure 
Variables 2SLS Financial Non-financial NLM 
MD VD ODL MD VD ODL MD VD ODL ODL 
Corporate governance variables        
BoardS  0.743  0.021**  0.072* 0.793 0.009*** 0.033**  0.023**  0.031**  0.013**  0.543 
 -0.308 -1.283 -1.081 0.028 0.140 0.117 -0.192 -0.105 -0.137  0.148 
BoardS2           0.364 
          -0.220 
DualP  0.877  0.025**  0.093* 0.908 0.002*** 0.015**  0.413  0.152  0.182  0.480 
 -0.594 -5.093 -4.124 0.009 0.126 0.100 -0.071 -0.072 -0.076  0.025 
BoCo  0.890  0.059**  0.191 0.571 0.074* 0.102  0.114  0.073*  0.055*  0.009*** 
 -0.039  0.316  0.236 0.073 0.115 0.109 -0.154 -0.101 -0.123 -0.109 
FreMee  0.891  0.055**  0.148 0.574 0.093* 0.324  0.153  0.001***  0.004***  0.001*** 
 -0.220 -1.828 -1.482 -0.057 0.085 0.051  0.119  0.161  0.158  0.126 
AuCo  0.143  0.502  0.274 0.299 0.433 0.961  0.165  0.001***  0.005***  0.003*** 
  0.464  0.125  0.220 -0.112 0.041 0.003  0.118  0.158  0.156  0.109 
Ownership structure variables    
ForOwn  0.716  0.019**  0.064* 0.117 0.002*** 0.002***  0.825  0.602  0.652  0.170 
 -0.309 -1.180 -1.001 0.294 0.289 0.303 -0.026 -0.035 -0.034 -0.161 
ForOwn2           0.094* 
           0.188 
GovOwn  0.016** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.809 0.124 0.298  0.910  0.635  0.789  0.219 
 -0.292 -0.325 -0.330 -0.049 0.153 0.106  0.016 -0.038 -0.024 -0.146 
GovOwn2           0.183 
           0.141 
InstOwn  0.916  0.045**  0.136 0.448 0.028** 0.041**  0.782  0.011**  0.064*  0.805 
  0.096  1.082  0.868 0.153 0.223 0.214 -0.031 -0.169 -0.139 -0.026 
InstOwn2           0.444 
           0.075 
DirOwn  0.931  0.033**  0.114 0.758 0.209 0.269  0.437  0.671  0.523  0.066* 
  0.233  3.383  2.696 0.059 0.118 0.107 -0.077 -0.024 -0.041  0.269 
DirOwn2           0.088* 
          -0.254 
Control variables   
FS  0.928  0.058**  0.183  0.214 0.592 0.805 0.141 0.363 0.955 0.101 
 -0.134  1.658  1.256 -0.169 0.035 -0.017 -0.144 0.051 -0.004 0.080 
FA  0.977  0.054**  0.160  0.780 0.418 0.451 0.420 0.291 0.282 0.251 
 -0.040 -1.581 -1.242  0.030 0.043 0.042 0.067 0.050 0.058 0.042 
Gearing  0.709  0.020**  0.066*  0.016** 0.154 0.837 0.949 0.703 0.820 0.353 
  0.395  1.459  1.241  0.223 -0.063 0.009 0.006 -0.020 -0.013 0.038 
Prof  0.847  0.010**  0.052**  0.165 0.066* 0.037** 0.272 0.631 0.861 0.266 
 -0.152 -1.203 -0.977  0.184 0.120 0.142 0.097 -0.024 0.010 0.047 
Liq  0.661  0.154  0.396  0.155 0.086* 0.044** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  0.272 -0.520 -0.334  0.324 0.193 0.235 0.308 0.156 0.210 0.181 
List  0.963  0.030**  0.112 0.009*** 0.079* 0.008*** 0.278 0.042** 0.063* 0.003*** 
 -0.093 -2.579 -2.034  0.297 0.096 0.153 0.133 0.144 0.150 0.161 
AudTyp  0.180 0.002*** 0.009***  0.841 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.096* 0.118 0.071* 0.222 
  0.139  0.150  0.157  0.022 0.198 0.160 0.222 0.120 0.157 0.136 
YD Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
D-W 1.728 2.059 1,998 1.800 2.171 2.069 1.626 2.044 1.844 1.983 
F-value 3.768 33.259 20.049 9.463 46.453 43.095 4.419 24.260 17.619 3.656 
Adj. R² 0.363 0.869 0.797 0.726 0.934 0.929 0.350 0.786 0.724 0.372 
N 193 193 193 65 65 65 128 128 128 193 
Notation: T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. D-W: Durbin-
Watson. 
 
 
 
